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Assessing Sexually Harassing Conduct in 
the Workplace: An Analysis of BC Human 
Rights Tribunal Decisions in 2010–16
Bethany Hastie
C’est dans les années 1980 que le harcèlement sexuel au travail a d’abord été re-
connu comme une forme de discrimination. Depuis lors, les concepts de harcèle-
ment sexuel et de discrimination ont considérablement évolué. Le présent article 
examine comment les tribunaux des droits de la personne abordent les plaintes en 
matière de harcèlement sexuel au travail à la lumière d’une analyse de décisions 
rendues par le Tribunal des droits de la personne de la Colombie-Britannique, de 
2010 à 2016. En observant la façon dont le tribunal détermine ce qui constitue le 
harcèlement sexuel, l’auteure suggère que, bien que les tribunaux des droits de la 
personne comprennent et analysent de mieux en mieux les plaintes de harcèlement 
sexuel, il subsiste des limites inhérentes à la nature individualiste de la loi anti-
discrimination et aux principes juridiques régissant les plaintes de harcèlement 
sexuel.
Sexual harassment in the workplace was first recognized as a form of discrimi-
nation in the 1980s. Since that time, the concepts of sexual harassment and dis-
crimination have evolved substantially. This article explores how human rights 
tribunals address complaints of sexual harassment in the workplace through a 
case analysis of BC Human Rights Tribunal decisions from 2010 to 2016. Focus-
ing on an examination of how the tribunal determines what constitutes sexually 
harassing conduct, this article suggests that, while human rights tribunals are 
advancing in their understanding and analysis of sexual harassment claims, there 
remain inherent limitations associated with the individualized nature of anti-dis-
crimination law and with the legal principles governing complaints of sexual 
harassment.
Introduction
The #MeToo movement has sparked renewed conversation, sensitivity, and mo-
mentum on the issue of workplace sexual harassment. In Canada, this movement 
follows investigations and inquiries concerning sexual misconduct and harassment 
in Canada, including in relation to the military and the Royal Canadian Mounted 
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 1. Marie Deschamps, “External Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in 
the Canadian Armed Forces” (27 March 2015), Government of Canada <https://www.
canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/ sexual-
misbehaviour/external-review-2015.html>; Colin Perkel, “Landmark Deal in RCMP
Sexual-Harassment Class Action Wins Court Approval”, CBC News (31 May 2017)
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/rcmp-sexual-harassment-class- 
action-1.4140138>; Canadian Press, “As Provinces Move to Ditch Heels in Sexist
Dress Codes, Experts Say Servers Aren’t the Only Ones Stuck Tottering”, National
Post (19 March 2017) <http://nationalpost.com/news/canada/as-provinces-move-
to-ditch-heels-in-sexist-dress-codes-experts-say-servers-arent-the-only-ones-stuck- 
tottering>.
 2. Sean Fine, “Ontario Human Rights Tribunal Gains Steam as Alternative Route for Sexual 
Assault Cases”, Globe and Mail (3 April 2018) <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/
canada/article-workplace-sexual-assault-survivors-claim-victory-at-human-rights/>.
 3. For existing scholarship on sexual harassment law in Canada, see e.g. Colleen Sheppard, 
“Systemic Inequality and Workplace Culture: Challenging the Institutionalization of
Sexual Harassment” (1994–95) 3 Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal
249 [Sheppard, “Systemic Inequality”]; Arjun P Aggarwal & Madhu M Gupta, Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace, 3rd ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 2000); Fay Faraday,
“Dealing with Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: The Promise and Limitations
of Human Rights Discourse” (1994) 32:1 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 32; Kathleen
Gallivan, “Sexual Harassment after Janzen v Platy: The Transformative Possibilities”
(1991) 49 University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 27; Sandy Welsh, Myrna
Dawson & Elizabeth Griffiths, “Sexual Harassment Complaints to the Canadian
Human Rights Commission”, Government of Canada <http://publications.gc.ca/
collections/Collection/SW21-43-1999E-5.pdf>; Susan M Hart, “Labour Arbitration
of Co-Worker Sexual Harassment Cases in Canada” (2012) 29:2 Canadian Journal
of Administrative Sciences 268; Sheryl L Johnson, Sexual Harassment in Canada:
A Guide for Understanding and Prevention (Toronto: Lexis Nexis Canada, 2017).
Police.1 These events illustrate the pervasiveness and seriousness of the issue of 
workplace sexual harassment, and increased legal action is expected to follow. Re-
cent evidence from Ontario, for example, suggests that legal claims concerning sexual 
harassment and misconduct are increasingly being pursued through human rights tri-
bunals.2 Relaxed evidentiary standards, a less adversarial context, and higher compen-
satory awards are cited as key advantages of pursuing a claim of sexual harassment 
through a human rights tribunal. Yet very little contemporary research has evaluated the 
substance of sexual harassment laws and their application in the human rights context.3
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 4. Janzen v Platy Enterprises, [1989] 1 SCR 1252 [Janzen].
 5. Sheppard, “Systemic Inequality”, supra note 3 at 256.
 6. Constance Backhouse, “Sexual Harassment: A Feminist Phrase That Transformed the
Workplace” (2012) 24:2 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 275 at 297–98. For
commentary on continued challenges complainants face pursuing sexual harassment
claims through legal vehicles, see also Aggarwal & Gupta, supra note 3.
 7. Sheppard, “Systemic Inequality”, supra note 3; Aggarwal & Gupta, supra note 3;
Faraday supra note 3; Gallivan supra note 3; Welsh, Dawson & Griffith supra note 3;
Hart supra note 3; and Johnson supra note 3.
 8. A second article examining the requirement that conduct be “unwelcome” is forthcom-
ing in the Canadian Journal of Women and the Law (2020).
The definition of sexual harassment was set out first by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in the 1989 decision in Janzen v Platy Enterprises: “[S]exual harassment 
in the workplace may be broadly defined as unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature 
that detrimentally affects the work environment or leads to adverse job-related 
consequences for the victims of the harassment.”4 Importantly, Janzen recog-
nized explicitly that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination, making 
it “reflective of a more contextualized and systemic approach that requires con-
necting the individual experience of the woman being harassed to the collective 
experiences and condition of women as a group.”5 Since that time, numerous 
legal cases have come before courts and tribunals, though, as noted by Constance 
Backhouse, these legal cases and victories have not been without obstacles, prob-
lems, and setbacks.6
As mentioned above, limited contemporary research exists that evaluates 
whether, and to what extent, human rights tribunals offer an effective vehicle for 
sexual harassment complaints.7 Given the complexity and subtlety with which sex-
ual harassment in the workplace might unfold, coupled with the historical problems 
noted by Backhouse, it is important to examine how human rights tribunals under-
stand and interpret the law of sexual harassment in their substantive decisions and to 
consider whether, and to what extent, they provide an effective remedial option for 
complainants.
This article is part of a larger project that aims to contribute to such an 
examination through a case analysis of BC Human Rights Tribunal (BCHRT) 
decisions from 2010 to 2016 concerning complaints of sexual harassment in 
employment settings. This article focuses particularly on how sexually harass-
ing conduct is defined and understood.8 Specifically, I outline the characteristics 
of the identified cases and engage in a qualitative analysis of the cases in rela-
tion to three key themes: evaluating the threshold of sexually harassing conduct; 
evaluating the impact of relational dynamics in assessing conduct; and evalu-
ating the impact of the broader workplace environment in assessing conduct. 
Through this article, I aim to provide a rich descriptive foundation for further 
research moving forward.
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 9. Kaitlyn Matulewicz, “Law and the Construction of Institutionalized Sexual Harassment 
in Restaurants” (2015) 30:3 Canadian Journal of Law and Society 401 at 408.
 10. Ibid, citing Gwen Brodsky & Shelagh Day, Strengthening Human Rights: Why
British Columbia Needs a Human Rights Commission (Vancouver: Poverty and
Human Rights Centre and Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2014) <https://
www.policyalternatives.ca/publications/reports/strengthening-human-rights>.
Human rights commissions in Canada have historically played a significant role
in defining and providing guidelines on sexual harassment. See Aggarwal &
Gupta, supra note 3 at 12–13; Ontario Human Rights Commission, “OHRC Policy
Position on Sexualized and Gender-Specific Dress Codes” <http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/
ohrc-policy-position-sexualized-and-gender-specific-dress-codes>.
 11. Regarding the reinstatement of the BC Human Rights Commission (BCHRT), see
Office of the Premier, “B.C. to Fight Inequality and Discrimination with Renewed
Human Rights Commission” (4 August 2017), Government of British Columbia
<https://news.gov.bc.ca/releases/2017PREM0069-001392>.
 12. RSBC 1996, c 210. Cf Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H 19, s 7 (which specifically
prohibits sexual harassment). See Aggarwal & Gupta, supra note 3 at 56.
 13. Deschamps, supra note 1; Perkel, supra note 1; Canadian Press, supra note 1.
 14. Constance Backhouse & Leah Cohen, The Secret Oppression: Sexual Harassment
of Working Women (Toronto: Macmillan, 1978); Carrie N Baker, The Women’s
Movement against Sexual Harassment (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2008).
British Columbia is currently one of only two jurisdictions in Canada without a 
Human Rights Commission,9 mandated to engage in public education and aware-
ness on human rights and discrimination, including in the workplace. The lack of a 
commission dedicated to preventing discrimination, engaging in education building, 
and developing guidelines and policy has been found to have created a “gaping hole 
in the province’s system of human rights protection.”10 The forthcoming reinstate-
ment of the BC Human Rights Commission may benefit from increased information 
and analysis of human rights complaints and discrimination in the province, includ-
ing sexual harassment claims, in order to inform its future work.11 Further, unlike 
other jurisdictions, British Columbia’s Human Rights Code does not contain specific 
provisions related to sexual harassment, instead subsuming this under the broader 
category of “sex discrimination.”12 Whether this broader wording, as opposed to 
more specific language, impacts the adjudication of sexual harassment claims has 
not yet been explored; this article sets the stage for further research in that regard 
and at a time when workplace sexual harassment issues are receiving intensified 
attention across Canada.13 Together, these factors create a context ripe for engage-
ment in understanding how the BCHRT encounters and addresses sexual harassment 
claims. The case selection for this article is limited to substantive decisions on the 
merits published between 2010 and 2016. While sexual harassment, as a legal con-
cept, dates back to the 1970s,14 the sample chosen for this article focuses on current 
trends and conceptualizations by the BCHRT concerning sexual harassment in the 
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 15. A longitudinal study on the evolution of the legal conceptualization of sexual harass-
ment, and the inclusion of cases dismissed in preliminary proceedings, would add
further depth to the findings of this article, as would a comparative study of several
provincial human rights tribunals. Although beyond the scope of this article, such stud-
ies are planned to follow.
 16. Backhouse, supra note 6 at 296–97, which concerns cases that preceded Janzen. See
also Aggarwal & Gupta, supra note 3 at 44–56, for a review of the development of sex-
ual harassment law and legal cases in Canada; Janine Benedet, “Pornography as Sexual 
Harassment” in Catherine McKinnon, ed, Directions in Sexual Harassment Law (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2004) 417 at 418–20 [Benedet, “Pornography”].
 17. Mahmoodi v UBC and Dutton, 1999 BCHRT 56 at paras 140–41 [Mahmoodi].
workplace, while providing a sample size feasible for a deeper qualitative analysis 
of decisions.15
This article proceeds in five parts. The first section reviews the legal principles 
attending complaints of sexual harassment as a form of discrimination and the exist-
ing scholarship that has commented upon these principles. The second section pro-
vides an overview of the characteristics of the identified cases, such as the gender 
and occupation of the complainant, industry of work, and relationship to the alleged 
harasser, and briefly describes how these characteristics map onto known trends and 
issues regarding sexual harassment in the workplace. The third, fourth, and fifth sec-
tions engage in a qualitative analysis of the decisions, focusing on the interpretation 
and application of the legal principles establishing conduct as sexual harassment and 
discussing limitations and problems arising in cases where conduct was determined 
not to constitute sexual harassment. As this article will suggest, though an import-
ant piece of overall response, human rights tribunals remain limited in their ability 
to fully understand and respond to the systemic and subtle ways in which sexual 
harassment in the workplace may unfold.
Sexual Harassment as Employment Discrimination: 
Legal Principles
As mentioned in the introduction, sexual harassment as a form of employment dis-
crimination was defined by the Supreme Court of Canada in Janzen v Platy En-
terprises, though it was not the first legal decision to consider such claims.16 Still, 
Janzen remains widely referred to in contemporary decisions for the wide-ranging 
definition of sexual harassment that it sets out. To establish a successful case of 
discrimination on the basis of sexual harassment, a complainant must prove, on a 
balance of probabilities, that the conduct in question occurred (and falls within the 
legal understanding of sexual harassment) and that the conduct was “unwelcome.”17 
The conduct does not have to be intentional, but it must have the effect of creating an 
adverse impact on the complainant’s working conditions or environment.
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 18. Ibid.
 19. Ibid at paras 135–36, citing Janzen, supra note 4; Arjun P Aggarwal, Sexual Harassment 
in the Workplace (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987). For a detailed list of the various
behaviours that may constitute sexual harassment, see Aggarwal & Gupta, supra note 3 
at 14–18. For a critical perspective on the definition of sexual harassment, see Gallivan, 
supra note 3.
 20. Gallivan, supra note 3 at 30.
 21. Ibid.
 22. Ibid at 29. See also Vicki Schultz, “Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment” (1998)
107:6 Yale Law Journal 1683.
 23. Backhouse, supra note 6 at 295; Gallivan, supra note 3 at 30, citing Catherine
MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979); Schultz, supra note 22.
 24. Matulewicz, supra note 9 at 402; Aggarwal & Gupta, supra note 3 at 11; Faraday,
supra note 3 at 37. For a review and debates of developments in the US context, see
Catherine A MacKinnon & Reva B Siegel, eds, Directions in Sexual Harassment Law
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004).
 25. Aggarwal & Gupta, supra note 3 at 119–20; Faraday, supra note 3 at 40–41.
The BCHRT, in Mahmoodi v University of British Columbia and Dutton,18 con-
firmed that conduct falling within the definition of sexual harassment may be physi-
cal or psychological, overt or subtle, and may include verbal innuendoes, affectionate 
gestures, repeated social invitations, and unwelcome flirting, in addition to more 
blatant conduct such as leering, grabbing, or sexual assault.19 The delineation of 
conduct in Mahmoodi reflects an understanding of the “range of practices [that] can 
create a hostile environment[,]”20 including verbal, visual, and physical harassment.
Verbal sexual harassment may take the form of sexual innuendo, taunts, jokes, and 
comments about a woman’s appearance or sexual habits. It may include derogatory 
name-calling. Sexual invitations or requests, whether direct or indirect, threatening 
or joking, may also be harassment. Displaying pornographic, derogatory, or sexually 
explicit photographs or other materials falls into the category of visual sexual harass-
ment, as do sexually explicit or suggestive gestures. And physical sexual harassment 
encompasses unnecessary touching, including physical and sexual assault.21
Expanding the type of conduct captured within the definition of sexual harassment 
works towards addressing sexual harassment as a form of sex inequality by recog-
nizing the myriad ways in which harassment can pose “a barrier to women’s equal 
participation in employment.”22 This definition further reflects the movement away 
from a narrow understanding of sexual harassment as “quid pro quo” sexual advances 
towards a broader conceptualization of the ways in which women experience adverse 
working conditions and treatment due to their sex.23 This is a positive development, 
given that subtle forms of sexual harassment have historically been viewed as a nor-
malized aspect of certain workplaces and relationships.24 However, determining 
when conduct amounts to sexual harassment has remained an issue for tribunals.25
Vol. 31 2019 299
 26. Sheppard, “Systemic Inequality”, supra note 3 at 258–59.
 27. Matulewicz, supra note 9 at 403, citing Hester Lessard, “Backlash in the Academy:
The Evolution of Campus Sexual Harassment Regimes” in Dorothy E Chunn, Susan
Boyd & Hester Lessard, eds, Reaction and Resistance: Feminism, Law, and Social
Change (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 164 at 169; Backhouse & Cohen, supra note
14 at 38–52; Baker, supra note 14. For an analysis of the power dimensions associated
with sexual harassment, see Gallivan, supra note 3; Faraday, supra note 3 at 49–50.
 28. Colleen Sheppard, Inclusive Equality: The Relational Dimensions of Systemic
Discrimination in Canada (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press,
2010) [Sheppard, Inclusive Equality]; Sheppard, “Systemic Inequality”, supra note 3
at 256–57.
 29. Sheppard, “Systemic Inequality”, supra note 3 at 256–59; Schultz, supra note 22.
Despite an expanded definition, the legal assessment of sexual harassment com-
plaints has been critiqued for the limitations associated with its individualized approach 
and for its failure to fully incorporate the progress made in anti-discrimination law, gen-
erally, in accounting for systemic discrimination.26 The “individualized dimensions of 
law’s conception of sexual harassment have prevailed over a more systemic understand-
ing” of this phenomenon, a critique that was initially raised by early legal feminists who 
connected sexual harassment to broader constructions of “masculinity, socialization 
processes, and gendered hierarchies of material and social power.”27 Despite inroads 
made in understanding the myriad ways in which sexual harassment in the workplace 
unfolds, and the changing norms and expectations concerning workplace relationships 
and gendered dimensions of work, this critique continues to bear relevance today. The 
individualized understanding of sexual harassment as perpetrated by a sole “bad actor” 
may displace the broader context in which workplace sexual harassment exists and do 
little to shift institutional expectations and norms.28 The focus on individualization also 
deflects attention from examining how general working conditions and workplace envi-
ronments may foster or constitute sexual harassment.29 Relatedly, this focus may stifle a 
deeper conversation and acknowledgement of the role that law, policy, and other social 
forces play in fostering conditions in which sexual harassment may occur. Finally, the 
individualized and categorized approach to sexual harassment claims does not appear 
to appreciate or account for the intersectional nature of discrimination.
The following sections will examine a body of case law from the BCHRT, with 
a view to understanding how these cases map onto, or diverge from, the identified 
critiques and problems.
Sexual Harassment Claims at the BCHRT: Characteristics
As discussed in the introduction, this article examines substantive decisions on the 
merits for workplace sexual harassment complaints at the BCHRT from 2010 to 2016. 
While this analysis provides an opportunity to examine the substantive interpretation 
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 30. Hart, supra note 3 at 274.
 31. Johnson, supra note 3 at 195.
 32. Under the Human Rights Code, supra note 12, s 13 (discrimination in employment).
 33. LaBelle v Campus Technologies and Another, 2010 BCHRT 116 [LaBelle]; Ratzlaff v
Marpaul Construction and Another, 2010 BCHRT 13 [Ratzlaff]; Tyler v Robnik and
Mobility World (No 2), 2010 BCHRT 192 [Tyler]; Soroka v Dave’s Custom Metal
Works and Others, 2010 BCHRT 239 [Soroka]; Skorka v Happy Day Inn and Others,
2010 BCHRT 306 [Skorka]; Wideman v Wiebe and Another (No 2), 2010 BCHRT 312
[Wideman]; Heyman v Saunders (No 2), 2010 BCHRT 88 [Heyman].
 34. Kang v Hill and Another (No 2), 2011 BCHRT 154 [Kang]; Young and Young on Behalf 
of Young v Petres, 2011 BCHRT 38 [Young]; McIntosh v Metro Aluminum Products and 
Another, 2011 BCHRT 34 [McIntosh].
 35. Q v Wild Log Homes and Another, 2012 BCHRT 135 [Q].
 36. MacDonald v Najafi and Another (No 2), 2013 BCHRT 13 [MacDonald]; Root v
Ray Ray’s Beach Club and Others, 2013 BCHRT 143 [Root]; Paananen v Scheller
(No 2), 2013 BCHRT 257 [Paananen]; Sleightholm v Metrin and Another (No 3), 2013 
BCHRT 75 [Sleightholm]; Kuchta v J Lanes Enterprises and Others, 2013 BCHRT 88
[Kuchta].
 37. Balikama Obo Others v Khaira Enterprises and Others, 2014 BCHRT 107 [Balikama
Obo].
 38. PN v FR and Another (No 2), 2015 BCHRT 60 [PN].
 39. LaBelle, supra note 33; Skorka, supra note 33; Heyman, supra note 33.
 40. Complaints were dismissed after a consideration of the merits in the following cases:
Wideman, supra note 33; Kang, supra note 34; Sleightholm, supra note 36; Kuchta,
supra note 36.
and application of the law of sexual harassment, there are limitations to this inquiry. 
First, many complaints will be settled prior to a full hearing and decision on the merits 
or dismissed at a preliminary stage. Moreover, many instances of sexual harassment are 
simply not reported. Complainants of sexual harassment may perceive significant dis-
incentives to pursue legal claims30 or to report harassment in the workplace, including a 
belief that nothing will be done, that the incident will be treated lightly or ridiculed, or 
that the complainant will be blamed or suffer repercussions.31 As such, the body of cases 
forming the analysis in this article cannot be said to be exhaustive or fully illustrative of 
how the law encounters sexual harassment in its specific and varied forms.
Eighteen decisions on the merits concerning complaints of sexual harassment in 
employment settings were identified in a search of BCHRT decisions from 2010 to 
2016:32 seven in 2010;33 three in 2011;34 one in 2012;35 five in 2013;36 one in 2014;37 
one in 2015;38 and zero in 2016. Of the identified cases, three complaints were dis-
missed because the complainant did not attend the hearing.39 Of the remaining fifteen 
decisions that followed from a hearing on the merits, eleven complaints were found 
justified, while four complaints were dismissed.40 This section describes the character-
istics of these fifteen complaints with substantive decisions on the merits, including in 
relation to: the gender of the complainants and individual respondents; the employment 
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 41. Certain characteristics, such as race and age, were not consistently identified in the
decisions. This is troubling given the often-intersectional nature of discrimination, as
mentioned in the previous section. As such, the characteristics discussed in this section
are limited to those explicitly acknowledged in the identified cases.
 42. Baker, supra note 14 at 4–5; Backhouse, supra note 6 at 295; Gallivan, supra note 3 at 28.
 43. Angus Reid Institute, “Three-in-Ten Canadians Say They’ve Been Sexually Harassed
at Work, but Very Few Have Reported This to Their Employers” (5 December 2014)
<http://angusreid.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/2014.12.05-Sexual- Harassment-at-
work.pdf>; Aggarwal & Gupta, supra note 3 at 1.
 44. Backhouse & Cohen, supra note 14; Baker, supra note 14; Sheppard, “Systemic
Inequality”, supra note 3; Kathryn Abrams, “The New Jurisprudence of Sexual
Harassment” (1998) 83:5 Cornell Law Review 1169.
 45. Heyman, supra note 33 (complaint was brought by a male employee but dismissed
because he did not attend the hearing).
 46. Backhouse, supra note 6; Faraday, supra note 3; Judy Fudge, “Rungs on the Labour
Law Ladder: Using Gender to Challenge Hierarchy” (1996) 60:2 Saskatchewan Law
Review 237; Baker, supra note 14; Sheppard, “Systemic Inequality”, supra note 3 at
267–72; Elizabeth Kristen, Blanca Banuelos & Daniela Urbant, “Workplace Violence
and Harassment of Low-Wage Workers” (2015) 36:1 Berkeley Journal of Employment
and Labour Law 169, citing Deborah L Rhode, “Sexual Harassment” (1992) 65:3
Southern California Law Review 1459 at 1461. See also Aggarwal & Gupta, supra
note 3 at 1 (noting that sexual harassment is “not confined to any one level, class, or
profession” but that, for example, “the Ontario Human Rights Commission complaints
show that 65 percent of all sexual harassment cases involve waitresses, clerks, secre-
taries, receptions, and other low-ranking service jobs” (ibid)).
relationship between the complainant and respondent; and the job and industry of 
work. As this section will establish, the characteristics of the identified complaints 
largely map onto dominant trends concerning workplace sexual harassment.41
Sexual harassment has long been recognized as a tactic used by male supervisors 
and co-workers to push women out of the workplace.42 Despite significant progress 
since the movement against sexual harassment began in the 1970s, it remains an endur-
ing issue today. A 2014 Angus Reid poll found that 43 percent of women in Canada 
reported experiencing sexual harassment in their workplace, compared to 12 percent 
of men.43 This bears a direct connection to the history of sex inequality in employment 
and the ways in which sexual harassment is a manifestation of that inequality.44 The 
gendered dimensions of workplace sexual harassment in the identified cases closely 
mirrored these general statistics and known trends. In the identified cases, all of the 
complaints, but one, were brought by women.45 The alleged harassers in all fifteen 
substantive decisions were male. These characteristics exemplify existing research 
findings that women are subject to sexual harassment at work far more often than men.
Sexual harassment complaints tend to arise in industries and jobs that are ser-
vice oriented, where women occupy a historically gendered and subordinated role 
or where women are engaged in jobs that are historically male dominated.46 These 
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 47. Sheppard, “Systemic Inequality”, supra note 3 at 267–72; Schultz, supra note 22.
 48. Wideman, supra note 33; Kuchta, supra note 36; Q, supra note 35; Kang, supra note
34; MacDonald, supra note 36; Sleightholm, supra note 36.
 49. Backhouse, supra note 6; Aggarwal & Gupta, supra note 3 at 1; Sheppard, “Systemic
Inequality”, supra note 3 at 274; Matulewicz, supra note 9, citing Jackie Krasas
Rogers & Kevin D Henson, “‘Hey, Why Don’t You Wear a Shorter Skirt?’ Structural
Vulnerability and the Organization of Sexual Harassment in Temporary Clerical
Employment” (1997) 11:2 Gender and Society 215.
 50. Matulewicz, supra note 9, citing Eleanor LaPointe, “Relationships with Waitresses:
Gendered Social Distance in Restaurant Hierarchies” (1992) 15:4 Qualitative
Sociology 377; Anthony D LaMontagne et al, “Unwanted Sexual Advances at Work:
Variations by Employment Arrangement in a Sample of Working Australians” (2009)
3:2 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 173; Anne C McGinley,
“Harassing Girls at the Hard Rock: Masculinities in Sexualized Environments” (2007)
27:4 University of Illinois Law Review 1229; Sheppard, “Systemic Inequality”, supra
note 3 at 275.
 51. Root, supra note 36 (restaurant); Young, supra note 34 (food services); Paananen, supra
note 36 (food services); Tyler, supra note 33 (retail); PN, supra note 38 (caregiving).
 52. Matulewicz, supra note 9 (discussing this issue in the restaurant industry).
 53. Ratzlaff, supra note 33; Soroka, supra note 33; McIntosh, supra note 34.
trends are illustrative of the underlying issues concerning the gendered dimensions 
of workplace sexual harassment and demonstrate how sexual harassment is used 
as a tactic to entrench sex inequality in the workplace and to push women out of 
workplaces thought to be traditionally “male oriented.” Finally, these trends further 
reflect the structural inequality that attends women’s positions in the workplace and 
the impact that this has on experiences of sexual harassment.47
The industries and jobs in which complainants in the identified cases worked 
map onto these existing trends. In six cases, complainants worked in office admin-
istration, such as in clerical roles or junior departmental roles (for example, com-
munications coordinator), in various office settings.48 These types of job roles were 
historically identified as “women’s work,” given their subordinated, and often sup-
portive, status in offices and have been the subject of commentary and research 
regarding their connection with sexual harassment.49 Five of the complainants per-
formed service-related work, which has similarly been noted as facilitating sex-
ual harassment and other forms of sex discrimination, often accompanied by the 
presence of a sexualized work environment, such as in the restaurant industry.50 
These included jobs in restaurants and other food services, caregiving, and retail.51 
As with administrative job roles, service jobs present women at work in a sup-
portive, servile, and subordinated capacity and, sometimes, as sexualized objects.52 
Finally, a total of four complaints arose from women performing work in histori-
cally male-dominated jobs and industries: three complaints arose from women per-
forming work in the construction and trades industry53 and one complaint from 
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 54. Balikama Obo, supra note 37.
 55. Baker, supra note 14 at 4.
 56. Sheppard, “Systemic Inequality”, supra note 3 at 271.
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work in silviculture.54 Women entering jobs traditionally held by men, especially in 
trades and resource industries, historically experienced sexual harassment as a form 
of hostility in entering “non-traditional” workplaces.55 The presence and isolation 
of women in a male-dominated workplace further “constitutes a structural source of 
vulnerability to sexual harassment.”56
As noted in existing literature,57 power is a driving force behind sexual harass-
ment, and the relational dynamics attending workplace sexual harassment have 
been linked to this notion of power, whether through formal authority, as in the 
case of a supervisor, or through an informal assertion of authority, as in the case of 
a co-worker. Power dynamics in the employment relationship figured prominently 
in the identified cases. Substantially more complaints arose against supervisors than 
co-workers: two complaints related to co-workers58 and thirteen to supervisors or 
individuals occupying a position of authority (such as the business owner). Power 
dynamics attending the employment relationship must also be understood in light of 
the fact that often, as in all of the identified cases here, the supervisor is male and 
the subordinate is female. Thus, the power held by the male supervisor also serves 
to entrench the inequality and subordination of the female worker, who may be dis-
couraged from voicing a complaint for fear of reprisal or retaliation.59
As noted in the first section, sexual harassment law has moved from a narrow 
understanding of “quid pro quo” sexual advances to a broader conceptualization of 
the myriad ways in which sexually harassing conduct seeks to undermine women’s 
equality in the workplace, through both subtle conduct such as sexual innuendo and 
jokes and through the creation of hostile working conditions.60 The particular con-
duct constituting sexual harassment in the identified cases was varied and encom-
passed a wide range of conduct that constitutes sexual harassment. Conduct ranged 
from overt and physical actions to more subtle forms of conduct such as jokes, innu-
endo, and romantic invitations. Seven of the eleven justified complaints involved 
physical touching, such as slapping or pinching a complainant’s bottom, grabbing 
a complainant, kissing, hugging, and touching a complainant’s breasts.61 Verbal 
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conduct included sexual innuendo and jokes as well as demeaning and denigrating 
comments related to the complainant’s sex.62 In five of the identified complaints, 
sexual invitations or propositions were made by the respondent.63 In several cases, 
persistent verbal conduct escalated to include physical touching.64 In addition, cases 
involving verbal harassment were “persistent” in nature, meaning that the complaint 
detailed multiple, ongoing instances of such harassment rather than a single inci-
dent.65 The range of conduct documented in the identified cases illustrates the varied 
and wide-ranging nature of sexually harassing conduct that continues to endure in 
contemporary workplaces. A more detailed discussion of the conduct identified in 
the cases follows in the next section.
Sexual Harassment Claims at the BCHRT: Analyzing the 
Conduct Element in Justified Complaints
As noted above, sexually harassing conduct includes a wide range of speech and ac-
tions, both physical and verbal, overt and subtle. This section engages in a qualitative 
analysis of the identified cases in order to gain a more detailed understanding of how 
the BCHRT understands and assesses this potentially wide range of conduct as sex-
ual harassment. This section analyzes cases where the conduct in question was found 
to constitute sexual harassment, though, as the next sections will outline, we may 
learn much more about the conduct threshold from the cases where this was not met.
Many of the identified cases involved blatant sexually harassing conduct, espe-
cially physical touching, such as poking breasts, slapping or pinching bottoms, and 
more serious conduct.66 An important theme cutting across the cases is the sexual 
nature of the conduct itself; rather than only being targeted at the complainant’s 
sex, the conduct in question in most of the successful cases was itself sexualized. 
For example, in Q v Wild Log Homes and Another, the complainant endured several 
instances of unwanted physical touching from her boss, including poking her breasts 
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and grabbing her buttocks as well as verbal harassment in the form of inquiring 
about her love life and professing feelings for her in emails and in conversations.67
In these cases, the BCHRT’s analysis tended to be rather succinct, and it was 
often simply stated that such conduct constituted harassment in line with the defi-
nition set out in Janzen.68 For example, in Q, the tribunal member determined that
the impugned conduct is demonstrative of the very type of situation that the 
Code’s prohibition on sexual harassment is designed to prevent. Mr. Walker 
was in a position of authority over Q. He used his business, and her eco-
nomic vulnerability within the employment relationship, to further his per-
sonal, romantic interests towards her and to “take liberties” with her. This 
had a detrimental effect on her work environment.69 
Indeed, the overt and sexual nature of the conduct at issue in most of the identified 
cases precluded the need for a detailed analysis on the conduct question.70
Respondents in some cases attempted to minimize their conduct, such as by charac-
terizing it as a “joke” or light-hearted, thus suggesting that it was not the kind of conduct 
defined as sexual harassment. However, these characterizations were not accepted by 
the tribunal members, often due to the overt sexual nature of the conduct in question. 
For example, in Tyler v Robnik, the tribunal member concluded that “[i]t is difficult to 
imagine how Mr. Robnik, Mobility’s district manager, offering his hotel room key to 
a subordinate female employee could be viewed as simply a joke.”71 In several cases, 
there were also clear indicia and findings of fact that the complainant communicated, or 
attempted to communicate, that the conduct in question was not welcome nor were the 
feelings reciprocated, further supporting a finding that such conduct constituted harass-
ment.72 In other words, in most cases, the complainant actively protested the conduct.
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Contrary to the dominant thread of verbal sexual harassment as overtly sexualized 
in nature (that is, sexual invitations, propositions and innuendo, or physical touch-
ing), one case in the identified set centred on demeaning language and commentary 
directed at the complainant’s sex. While this might be readily understood as sex 
discrimination, the tribunal member in this case framed the issue as one of sex-
ual harassment, potentially widening the definition of workplace sexual harassment 
beyond conduct that is sexualized in nature.73
In MacDonald v Najafi and Another (No 2), the complainant, Ms. MacDonald, 
worked as a graphic designer at a small business in Vancouver. Other than the own-
er’s wife, she was the only female employee at the time.74 MacDonald filed a human 
rights complaint against the company and its owner—her supervisor—for discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex and marital status.75 The basis of her complaint concerned 
verbal conduct that was demeaning and targeted towards her sex, including whistling 
at her to come “like a dog,”76 commenting that she “needed a man,”77 “chastising” 
her for not being married,78 and making comments about her appearance.79 In his 
analysis, the tribunal member framed the issue around sexual harassment, citing the 
definition from Janzen.80 However, the tribunal member noted that the complainant 
was not required to establish that the respondent’s conduct was “sexual,” only that 
“he treated her adversely in connection with her employment .  .  . at least in part 
because she was a woman.”81 While not expressly stated in the decision, it could 
be that the tribunal member focused on the broader category of sex discrimination, 
even if the complaint was framed as one of sexual harassment. Alternatively, the tri-
bunal member may have understood that sexual harassment encompasses numerous 
types of conduct, not only those that sexualize the complainant. This may have pos-
itive implications for broadening the concept of sexual harassment in the workplace 
from one that focuses more narrowly on sexual invitations, propositions, touching, 
and innuendo to a broad array of conduct that discriminates against, demeans, and 
objectifies women. Such a broadened understanding, in turn, may have benefits for 
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advancing the equality of women in the workplace by properly naming the myr-
iad ways in which they experience inequality through discriminatory conduct and 
may shed greater light on institutionalized aspects or forms of sexual harassment as 
discrimination.
Overall, despite the expanded definition of sexual harassment and the broad array 
of conduct potentially set out within it, justified complaints, as described in this 
section, continue to reflect a narrow and historical understanding of sexual harass-
ment centred on physical touching and “unwelcome overtures for sex” or “quid pro 
quo” sexual advances.”82 This finding, while not fully exhaustive or conclusive, does 
raise questions about whether, and to what extent, human rights tribunals may be 
equipped to address subtle or complex cases and, thus, the effectiveness of human 
rights law in currently responding to sexual harassment in its myriad forms.
Sexual Harassment Claims at the BCHRT: Relational Dynamics 
and the Assessment of Conduct
While the earlier section detailed the kinds of conduct that have been found to clearly 
fall within the parameters of sexual harassment, the cases that were dismissed for 
substantive reasons perhaps tell us most about how human rights tribunals under-
stand and evaluate conduct and where the “threshold” for harassment lies.83 Four of 
the identified cases were dismissed for substantive reasons following a full hearing, 
and, in all of these cases, the conduct at issue was found not to constitute sexual 
harassment. In each of these cases, the credibility of the complainant was called into 
question by the tribunal member,84 though even accepting the facts as presented, the 
reasoning in the cases establishes that the conduct was understood to fall below the 
requisite threshold. These cases thus raise important questions about the threshold 
and limits of how human rights tribunals define sexually harassing conduct. These 
cases present two themes that appear to pose enduring problems in assessing sexual 
harassment complaints, related to, first, understanding relational dynamics, and, sec-
ond, accounting for the broader workplace environments. This section will take up 
the first issue, while the following section will explore the second.
As noted earlier in this article, sexual harassment is conceptualized in a way 
that emphasizes a power imbalance in the employment relationship. The relational 
dynamics between a complainant and a harasser are an important indicator in identi-
fying and assessing sexual harassment complaints. However, despite the importance 
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of recognizing the role that economic and other power norms play in facilitating 
sexual harassment in the workplace, reliance on this criterion might inadvertently 
result in a narrower understanding of workplace sexual harassment, as suggested by 
the decision in Kang v Hill.
In Kang, the complainant, Ms. Kang, was hired as a full-time administrative 
assistant for Mr. Hill’s company, shortly after she graduated from university.85 
Approximately one month into her employment, Hill disclosed to Kang that he had 
romantic feelings for her.86 Hill also, at a later date, showed the complainant a doc-
ument that listed “reasons why he loved her.”87 Drawing on what was described as 
a factually similar case,88 the tribunal member concluded that the conduct in ques-
tion, while it may be inappropriate, did not constitute sexual harassment because the 
respondent did not “proposition” Kang, there was not a significant age difference 
between them, there was no physical contact, Kang did not fear for her safety at any 
time, and the respondent did not repeat any behaviour that Kang had communicated 
was unwelcome.89 These factors are a troubling representation of the boundaries of 
sexual harassment.
While the factors noted above by the tribunal member are certainly represen-
tative of some forms of sexually harassing conduct and its impacts, conduct that 
meets the threshold of sexual harassment should not be limited to these character-
istics. It is concerning, for example, that conduct meeting the threshold of sexual 
harassment would be limited to conduct that causes the complainant to fear for her 
safety. Similarly, it is curious why a significant difference in age would necessarily 
impact the assessment of whether conduct constitutes sexual harassment, given that 
harassers may be both supervisors and co-workers and that power imbalances often 
reflect workplace hierarchy, regardless of age. Finally, the notion that there must be 
a “proposition” relies on historically narrow understandings of sexual harassment as 
sexual advances rather than the broader definition set out in Mahmoodi and poten-
tially expanded upon further in MacDonald.
The complainant’s own behaviour seemed to influence the tribunal member’s rea-
soning in this case. For example, Hill testified that Kang asked him intimate ques-
tions, such as “how his sex life was, whether he was truly happy in his marriage, and 
whether he had really found the right person.”90 The tribunal member determined 
that, while this was not evidence of her interest in a romantic or sexual relationship, 
“her questions and comments led Mr. Hill to believe, correctly, that, notwithstanding 
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their employment relationship, she was prepared to discuss deeply personal matters 
with him”91—in other words, that Kang invited and encouraged the respondent to 
converse with her about his feelings.92 This impacted the tribunal member’s assess-
ment of the power dynamics in the relationship in determining whether the conduct 
in question constituted harassment in this context:
I do not think that Mr. Hill’s confession was wise or even appropriate, but in 
the context of his workplace relationship with Ms. Kang at that time, I find 
that it did not, standing alone, amount to discrimination against her based on 
her sex. Rather than being simply an assertion of his power, it was also an 
acknowledgement of his weakness, which to some degree placed him under 
her power, rather than the other way around.93 
This is a particularly troubling statement because of the underlying sentiment it 
communicates about intimate relationships and gender roles. The idea that since 
Hill, her supervisor, had displayed “weakness” or vulnerability by communicating 
to Kang that he held romantic feelings for her, and that this gave her power in their 
employment relationship, seems to directly feed into problematic myths concerning 
women’s power of seduction and sexuality over men and the use of such myths to 
blame women for violence done to them.94
While the tribunal member goes on to state that he is “not overlooking the fact 
that there is a necessary imbalance of power between a new, probationary employee 
and her boss,” he nonetheless finds that Kang wielded her own power and that the 
“circumstances of this case do not reveal an assertion of either form of power [sexual 
and economic] by Mr. Hill over Ms. Kang.”95 This statement, coupled with the earlier 
findings regarding the complainant’s behaviour in encouraging intimate conversa-
tions, illustrates the continued problems in explaining and understanding the myriad 
strategies women may employ to deflect harassing or discriminatory behaviour or to 
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appease the actors engaged in such conduct. In addition, this reasoning ignores the 
economic power that the respondent held over Kang by virtue of being her employer, 
despite the cursory acknowledgement given to this relationship. In addition, Kang’s 
attempts to assert economic demands following the events in question were treated 
as suspicious and diminished her credibility in the eyes of the tribunal member.96
Statements of the kind made by the tribunal member in Kang further deflect atten-
tion away from the alleged harasser’s own conduct, which should be at the centre 
of the analysis, rather than the complainant’s response to it. In this case, the tri-
bunal member concluded that, while he would “hesitate to characterize Mr. Hill’s 
behaviour towards Ms. Kang (or her response) as ‘normal social interaction’ .  .  . 
I do not think it crossed the line into sexual harassment.”97 This leaves open the pos-
sibility that a supervisor may engage in “inappropriate” workplace conduct without 
legal repercussion.
Overall, the reasoning set out in Kang illustrates enduring, and troubling, obsta-
cles that complainants face in pursuing sexual harassment claims. In addition to ques-
tioning the complainant’s motivations and credibility, the presence of problematic 
myths concerning women’s sexuality and gender roles appears to have influenced at 
least a part of the overall analysis of the situation, reflecting the continuing impact of 
stereotypes and gender expectations for women who may present as less-than-ideal 
complainants. In addition, the narrow understanding of factors that will combine 
to constitute sexual harassment (such as the age disparity, need for explicit sexual 
propositions, and others described earlier) produces a restrictive conceptualization 
of workplace sexual harassment and a reductive narrative of who a legitimate com-
plainant of sexual harassment is.
Wideman v Wiebe similarly centred on examining the particular employment rela-
tionship between the complainant and the individual respondent and the intimacy of 
that relationship. While the relational dynamics in Wideman, and the BCHRT’s anal-
ysis of it, may be less troubling on the surface than in Kang, it does provide a point 
of departure for raising further questions about the complicated nature of relational 
dynamics and the ability of human rights tribunals to fully engage with these issues. 
In Wideman, the complainant worked for a community organization and reported 
directly to the organization’s chair, Mr. Wiebe.98 While there was no explicit disclo-
sure of romantic or sexual feelings, as there was in Kang, the complainant testified 
to several incidences where she alleged that the respondent asked personal questions 
and made statements that could be understood as sexual and demeaning.99 For exam-
ple, the complainant testified that the respondent “told her that working with her was 
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like taking a woman to dance and being unsure how the night will turn out.”100 The 
complainant also alleged that the respondent made comments regarding her looks, 
told her that they had a “special relationship,” and disclosed that he had moved due 
to a prior relationship with a female co-worker,101 all of which could be understood 
to have a sexual or romantic undertone. In addition, the complainant alleged that the 
respondent made several demeaning comments to her, such as calling her a “single, 
cynical, bitter women”102 and referring to her as a “harlot.”103 Like in MacDonald, 
these comments could be understood as derogatory comments specifically targeting 
the complainant’s sex.
As the tribunal member in Wideman described, “what Ms. Wideman alleges is an 
unhealthily obsessive relationship marked by a pattern of over-protectiveness, jealousy 
and perhaps fixation that, taken as a whole, she says amounts to sexual harassment and 
discrimination.”104 Unlike the overtly sexualized nature of conduct in the  successful 
cases discussed earlier in this article, this case centred on conduct that, while targeted 
towards Wideman as a woman, may not be as readily understood as sexualized in 
nature. The tribunal member seems to affirm this in noting that “[t]he conduct alleged 
in this complaint does not involve leering, grabbing, touching or propositioning. 
Further, even considered objectively, there is little in the conduct that could be con-
sidered sexual innuendo.”105 This statement could indicate that the tribunal member 
questioned whether the conduct at issue was sexual harassment and thus points to the 
possibility of a narrow interpretation of sexual harassment.
The complainant’s credibility in this case was put into question by the tribu-
nal member;106 as a result, the tribunal member did not accept her testimony and 
found that she did not establish her claim. In reviewing the evidence offered by 
the complainant and other witnesses, the tribunal member found that, contrary to 
her assertions that Wiebe had an “obsessive” and “jealous” fixation with her, his 
conduct demonstrated “genuine concern” for her well-being and a more paren-
tal-like responsibility.107 For example, the tribunal member stated: “I think it more 
likely that he [Wiebe] took his responsibility to her . . . seriously.”108 The tribunal 
member also noted that the institutional culture of the organization “encouraged 
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relationships and intimacy between staff” and that “Ms. Wideman sought a family- 
like and intimate relationship with Mr. Wiebe and members of his immediate and 
extended family.”109
The outcome in Wideman was significantly impacted by a finding of 
non-credibility of the complainant and, thus, of the specific allegations noted ear-
lier. However, the case nonetheless raises questions about how human rights tribu-
nals understand and assess relational dynamics in the workplace. This case further 
hints at the impact that institutional culture and workplace environments might 
have in the assessment of sexual harassment complaints, as the next section takes 
up in further detail.
Sexual Harassment Claims at the BCHRT: The Workplace 
Environment and Its Impact on Conduct Assessment
In addition to the problems posed in understanding relational dynamics in the work-
place, the ability for human rights tribunals to fully account for workplace envi-
ronments and institutional culture in their assessment of sexual harassment claims 
appears to present further challenges.110 This section describes two cases where the 
workplace environment impacted the overall assessment of the complaint: Kuchta v 
J Lanes Enterprises and Sleightholm v Metrin. In Kuchta, the complainant worked at 
a bowling alley, a small business owned by the individual respondent. While at work, 
Ms. Kuchta found inappropriate pictures of naked women and children on a shared 
workplace computer in a file folder called “Dan.”111 The tribunal member found that 
the owner of the bowling alley, Mr. (Dan) Smith, downloaded the pictures.112 Kuchta 
testified that this was not the first time she had discovered inappropriate images on 
the computer, and, after inaction on the part of the business owners, she resigned from 
her job.113 Kuchta argued that “having such pictures on a common work computer 
constitutes harassment,” implying that this created a sexualized work environment.114
The tribunal member found that the conduct in question did not constitute sexual 
harassment, noting that “[t]he circumstances of this case do not reveal an assertion 
of either form of power [economic or sexual] by Mr. Smith over Ms. Kuchta.”115 In 
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other words, emphasis was placed, in part, on the lack of active conduct directed at 
the complainant by the individual respondent. However, this ignores the fact that a 
sexual harassment claim can be based on a “poisoned work environment.” A “poi-
soned work environment” may reflect the existence of a broad-based workplace cul-
ture that sexualizes, demeans, or otherwise discriminates against women.116 While 
the tribunal member’s reasoning acknowledged broader environmental concerns, she 
also found that the fact that the images were not immediately deleted did not result 
in a “worsening of the workplace environment.”117
This case reveals potential limitations in understanding sexual harassment as a 
human rights violation, especially for claims that rely on a generally sexualized or poi-
soned work environment rather than on particular conduct engaged in by an individual 
actor. For example, while few legal cases have considered pornography in the work-
place as forming the basis of sexual harassment claims, it is clearly identified as such 
in principle.118 This is because the “presence of pornography in the workplace creates 
an unequal working environment for women,”119 though cases where this has formed 
the successful basis of a human rights complaint have also involved verbal comments 
made by individuals.120 The presence of pornography alone may be insufficient to 
create a “sexually harassing work environment” under human rights law, despite the 
fact that its presence creates a sexualized working environment.121 This limitation is 
due to the fact that the legal principles governing discrimination claims have been 
largely developed and interpreted in a way that relies on individual actors responsible 
for actively engaging in prohibited conduct. In many jurisdictions, this limitation may 
be mitigated by the public education work of a human rights commission, which, for 
example, could set out guidelines prohibiting pornography in the workplace,122 thus 
engaging in preventive activities that work to shift institutional norms and expecta-
tions, filling the gap of the individual complaints-based process of the tribunal.
In Sleightholm, the complainant worked as a communications coordinator for 
Metrin, a company that manufactures and sells skin care products. Ms. Sleightholm 
brought a human rights complaint against Metrin and its owner, Mr. Fukuhara, 
related to incidences involving intimate conversations,123 the sharing and discussion 
of sexually provocative materials,124 and one instance where the complainant alleged 
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that the respondent tried to kiss her.125 In her analysis, the tribunal member ques-
tioned the credibility of the complainant, and this affected her findings of fact and 
application of the legal principles.126 However, aside from this, she also found that, 
given the particular workplace environment at Metrin,127 certain incidences, while 
they might otherwise have amounted to sexual harassment, did not. For example, the 
complainant pointed to conduct such as hugging and blowing kisses. The tribunal 
member found, however, that this behaviour was “normal for the office they were 
in and was not protested by her or any other employee.”128 In addition, one incident 
involved Fukuhara sharing a dream he had of Sleightholm in a bath.129 The tribunal 
member noted that sharing this dream “might easily be construed as amounting to 
sexual harassment” in another context, but the sharing and interpretation of dreams 
was a frequent “subject of conversation” at Metrin.130 This fact, coupled with the 
complainant’s own regular participation in such activities, affected the characteriza-
tion of the conduct in question.131
The analysis and outcome in Sleightholm was heavily influenced by the negative 
credibility assessment of the complainant. However, this case also illustrates the 
complexity and difficulty of accounting for workplace culture in assessing sexual 
harassment complaints. The “bath dream” exemplifies this problem. While it may 
have been normal in that workplace to discuss and interpret dreams, this should 
not equate to finding that any and all subject matter of dreams are appropriate for 
discussion. More broadly, while context is important to evaluating conduct, this case 
illustrates the problems that can arise when a workplace environment is taken as a 
neutral background for assessing sexual harassment132 rather than critically evaluat-
ing that environment itself or identifying and articulating boundaries on workplace 
environments or culture when it crosses the threshold of appropriate conduct. This 
reflects a much wider problem of normalized sexual harassment against women and 
the inadequacy of legal tools to address this issue.133
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Overall, despite broad recognition of the ways in which a workplace environ-
ment or institutional culture can foster a generalized sexually discriminatory and 
harassing environment, the ability of human rights tribunals to fully account for this 
context appears constrained. This appears connected, in part, to a continued focus on 
individual bad actors engaged in active conduct, which is a critique of sexual harass-
ment law noted in the first section. However, accounting for the ways in which a 
broader workplace environment can impact on, and colour, the conduct of individual 
actors appears to be a necessary factor for tribunals to consider in assessing sexual 
harassment claims. As such, this may present an area for further research and/or 
work by human rights commissions.
Conclusion
This article has described and assessed substantive decisions on the merits of work-
place sexual harassment claims at the BCHRT from 2010 to 2016, focusing on an 
analysis of what conduct constitutes sexually harassing behaviour. While the issue of 
workplace sexual harassment is an ongoing concern, limited research has documented 
its substantive treatment in law in contemporary contexts.134 As workplace sexual 
harassment has largely become the purview of anti-discrimination law, within the 
domain of human rights tribunals, gathering information on the characteristics and 
analysis of such complaints provides firm grounding for further work on this issue.
Overall, the identified cases discussed in this article establish that the broad defi-
nition of sexually harassing conduct set out in Janzen and Mahmoodi has brought 
positive developments to assessing workplace sexual harassment under human rights 
law. For complaints that more easily fit within historical understandings of sexual 
harassment—conduct that is sexualized in nature, that involves physical touching or 
sexual propositions, and is perpetrated by an individual actor—human rights tribu-
nals appear well equipped to assess such claims. However, the identified cases have 
also highlighted enduring issues attending the legal assessment of sexual harass-
ment. Accounting for institutionalized dimensions of sexual harassment in the work-
place, beyond specific instances of harassment by an individual bad actor, appears to 
present an ongoing challenge for tribunals. In addition, because the body of identi-
fied cases most often centres on blatant forms of sexual harassment, it is unclear how 
well equipped tribunals may be to account for, and remedy, covert and subtle forms 
of sexual harassment in the workplace. The cases examined in this article raise con-
cerns about the ability of tribunals to understand and properly account for nuanced 
and complicated relational dynamics in assessing subtle, covert, or other conduct 
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not overtly sexual in nature. Finally, as documented in Kang, and to a lesser degree 
in Wideman, problematic myths concerning complainant behaviour may continue to 
influence the assessment of sexual harassment claims.
As noted at several points throughout this article, issues related to credibility, 
character, and consent intersect in significant ways with the assessment of conduct 
and the outcome of cases in the identified set. Forthcoming research on these issues 
will add greater depth to understanding the problematic trends in adjudication high-
lighted throughout these cases and will shed additional light on the work to be done 
to ensure that human rights tribunals are an effective legal vehicle through which to 
respond to sexual harassment claims, not only for procedural reasons but also, sig-
nificantly, for their substantive understanding and application of sexual harassment 
law.
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